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Copeland, Gerry Makepeace, Gerald Harbour and others in the Cardiff University economics workshop. 1 Introduction
Our aim in this paper is to take the simplest possible Real Business Cycle model and adapt it to endogenous
growth in such a way that we can use dynamic testing techniques on its aggregate predictions, using the
Penn Table post-war data. The empirical testing of endogenous growth has largely to date consisted of
running ￿ reduced form￿equations on panel data for large numbers of countries over the post-war period.1
However there are di¢ culties in this approach. If one writes down a model of endogenous growth (as we will
shortly do) one ￿nds that it is complex and non-linear so that it does not have a linear reduced form; thus
the ￿ reduced forms￿written down for testing are no more than guesses at the variables, either exogenous or
predetermined, that might be included among the determinants of growth. Even if their inclusion is correct,
the omitted variables will in general include powers or other combinations of these included variables; hence
the error terms will be correlated with the regressors and there will be bias whose size and direction cannot
be estimated reliably.
A further problem is one of identi￿cation. We do not know what model is generating these ￿ reduced
forms￿ ; many di⁄erent models could give rise to some relationships between the chosen regressors and growth.
For example if the regressors are correlated (due to transmission within the model) with the true causal
mechanisms whatever they are one could obtain signi￿cant regression coe¢ cients on the chosen regressors
which in fact come from a quite di⁄erent set of causes.
For such reasons the large literature above may not be regarded as entirely persuasive evidence. Those
for example who think R&D is the major factor determining growth will not be impressed by regressions
showing that tax rates are correlated with growth. Vice versa with regressions highlighting R&D those
favouring the tax explanation are unwilling to be persuaded.
In this paper we take a new approach to testing, one that we have used in other areas of macro with
we believe some promising results (see Minford (2006) for an informal account of these; a recent example
applying the method to models of in￿ ation persistence is Minford, Sofat, Nowell and Srinivasan (2006)). This
approach is Popperian; we start by insisting on a clearcut ￿ null hypothesis￿by which we mean a hypothesis
treated as true for purposes of testing (by ￿ null￿is strictly meant the ￿ zero￿hypothesis of no relationships
at all because this is the one that is taken to be rejected in much statistical testing; however we adopt the
de￿nition of ￿ working￿or ￿ initially believed￿hypothesis here because in our approach it will be this, not the
zero hypothesis that is to be rejected). This null hypothesis is the micro-founded (structural) theory of
1Leach (2003) and OECD (Leibfritz et al, 1997) provide useful surveys of this literature. Studies include Barro (1991),
Koester and Kormendi (1989), Hansson and Henrekson (1994), Cashin (1995), Engen & Skinner (1996), Leibfritz et al (op.
cit.), Alesina et al. (2002), Bleaney, Gemmell & Kneller (2000), Folster & Henrekson (2000), Bassanini & Scarpetta (2001),
Benson and Johnson (1986), Chao and Grubel (1998), Easterly and Rebelo (1993), Grier and Tullock (1989), King and Rebelo
(1990), Levine and Renelt (1992), Peden and Bradley (1989), Plosser (1992), Scully (1989, 1991, 1995), Slemrod (1995), Smith
(2001), Vedder and Gallaway (1998).
2endogenous growth in this case that we are going to test.
This theory being speci￿ed is then calibrated or estimated on the data so that its structural equations
have an implied set of errors. Under the null these errors are the true errors, warts of approximation and
all. Thus these errors contain vital information about the model￿ s implications; di⁄erent models ￿ slice reality
(data)￿between model and error di⁄erently. We exploit this fact in what follows; this exploitation we may
note in passing crucially distinguishes what we do from methods of simulation in widespread use (such as the
Simulated Method of Moments- see Minford, Theodoridis and Meenagh (2005)) where errors are typically
imposed. Our concern is to use the information in the data to the maximum in the testing process.
We use approximative techniques to derive the structural equations to the full non-linear model. The
implication is that the errors contain the terms omitted via the approximation ￿ these will include second
and higher order terms of Taylor series expansion when only ￿rst order approximation is done as is our
practice here. In addition there may be other terms in the error that have deliberately been omitted even
after ￿rst-order approximation; an example would be where a variable cannot be explicitly solved for (such
as below the ratio of consumption to GDP). Thus the error terms contain all the information about the e⁄ect
of variables in the model but omitted from an equation as well as of pure error terms such as productivity
or preference shocks. (Notice that they will in general all be simultaneously correlated for this reason).
When drawing policy conclusions this must be carefully taken into account ￿ Lucas￿critique ￿ provided
the policy change does not alter the stochastic processes of the model it can be evaluated.
However our ￿rst purpose is to test the null hypothesis against the data. We may use the data to estimate
the structural equations and we then use the data to imply the model errors. The model may still not ￿t
the ￿ facts of correlation between variables￿ . This could be so even with a model estimated carefully on the
data at a ￿ structural equation by equation￿level; the reason for example could be that it is mis-speci￿ed in
some way. As we know a mis-speci￿ed model may still ￿t at the equation level with the error term picking
up the mis-speci￿cation.
We can think of the facts against which the model is being measured as being like the ￿ reduced forms￿
discussed above. These are not true reduced forms of any relevant model; but they are descriptions of
relationships between variables. In business cycle studies the facts are often represented by VARs. However
in growth studies the facts of interest are naturally represented by panel relationships between growth and
various regressors. Many such descriptions are possible; the empirical studies referred to earlier examplify
a wide variety. One thing we can say is that the true model will ￿ predict these facts￿in a certain sense:
these facts must lie within the statistical distribution implied by the model. That is, if we can derive the
distribution of possible results for such relationships implied by the model, then we can ask whether the
relationship found in the actual facts lies within some agreed (say 95%) set of con￿dence limits.
3We can derive these con￿dence limits by bootstrapping the errors in the model. For these errors represent
the true source of sampling variability under the null hypothesis. Thus by replicating these errors in repeated
random draws from them and inputting these draws into the model we may replicate the sampling variability
of the model and hence the statistical distributions implied for our ￿ relationship facts￿ . It is this procedure
that underlies our testing of the model against the facts. We derive a pure test of the model in this way. Of
course matters do not end there. If the model is rejected we have to decide on an alternative and test that
in turn; if it is accepted we still must discover whether an alternative would also be accepted or whether it is
rejected. These questions we attempt to answer in this paper for a limited ￿ alternative￿to our basic model.
In what follows we go into the exact methods in a lot of detail but this account has, we hope, outlined
our method and the reasons for it.
2 A model of endogenous growth for a small open economy
We begin (essentially as in Gillman and Kejak (2005)) from a standard intertemporal utility function and
a perfectly competitive ￿rm sector with a Cobb-Douglas production function, from which households derive
wages for their labour supply as workers and dividends for their capital; under constant returns to scale
dividends and wages add up to total GDP. We assume that each household owns a corresponding ￿rm for
which it works (at competitive wage rates because it could always decide to work elsewhere) and also may
undertake entrepreneurial activity to innovate its methods, so raising its productivity. This is the model￿ s
mechanism of endogenous growth; notice that it is essentially the same as the diversion of people￿ s time
to education or to R&D, each of which also would raise productivity. However each household must buy
its consumption and investment goods from other ￿rms. Government taxes both in order to make transfer
payments back to households (for redistributive purposes) and there is no government spending. The economy
is open but is ￿ small￿in the strictest sense; that is, it can borrow on world markets at the world real interest
rate and its goods prices are also set on world markets.
We go on to show that this economy for our purposes (examining its growth behaviour) can be summarised
in three equations: the production function reduced to a function of productivity and labour supply, a labour
supply function of labour/consumption taxation, and a productivity function of the accumulated tax rate
on entrepreneurial activity.
43 Derivation of the 3-equation model





t(lnct + ￿tllnxt) (1)
where ￿t is a stationary preference error process,
subject to
(1 + ￿t)ct + kt ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)kt￿1 + bt = yt + (1 + rt￿1)bt￿1 + ￿t ￿ ￿tzt (2)
where:
￿ is the tax rate on consumption ￿ this is assumed to be the sole general tax (so that dividends and
wages are taxed indirectly through consumption);
￿ is tax levied on entrepreneurial activity;
consumption (c), capital stock (k), foreign bonds (b), leisure (x), entrepreneurial activity (z) and govern-
ment transfers (￿) are all expressed per capita;
￿ is depreciation and r is the real rate of interest on foreign bonds. Goods are bought by some system of





t (1 ￿ xt ￿ zt)1￿￿￿￿ is the Cobb-Douglas production function of the household (and ￿rm
combined). X represents exogenous other production factors ￿ such as ￿ land￿ /natural resources ￿ assumed
to be owned by households.







(from the ￿rst derivatives of the Lagrangean with respect to current and future consumption)
E0￿1[1 ￿ ￿] = ￿0[1 ￿
￿y0
k0 ] (from the ￿rst derivative with respect to capital, kt )




x0 (from the ￿rst derivative with respect to leisure).
At this stage we treat entrepreneurial activity, z, as ￿xed. But we will return to it once we have introduced
productivity determination below.








the condition relating the marginal product of capital (which we also denote by the shadow real dividend
rate, dt) to world real interest rates plus depreciation:




and the condition relating labour supply to the marginal product of labour (which we also denote by the
shadow real wage,wt):
a)wt =
(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)yt





Using the marginal productivity of capital condition, we can replace capital in the production function












t (1 ￿ xt ￿ zt)
1￿￿￿￿
1￿￿ (6)
What this means is that the household can obtain whatever capital it needs to produce its desired output
at a ￿xed price on world markets; thus it is only limited in the output it can produce by the supply of labour
o⁄ered at the going shadow wage.
We now turn to the determination of productivity growth and the marginal condition determining z.
In this model representative households choose how much to invest and work within their available
production technology. This technology is assumed here to improve through households￿ innovation by
￿nding out about better processes. We assume that there is some innovative or entrepreneurial activity a
household can undertake which involves spending the time denoted as z above. In endogenous growth models
one key channel of growth is via labour being withdrawn from ￿ normal￿work and being used for an activity
that raises productivity. Here we think of it as ￿ innovation￿ , as in Klette and Kortum (2004); in Lucas￿
models (Lucas (1988)) it would be ￿ education￿ ; in models stressing R&D, as in Aghion and Howitt (1998), it
would be research activity. Notice that in all three ways that productivity growth might be enhanced, the
maximisation issue is exactly the same: the household must divert an appropriate amount of time away from
standard work into this growth-enhancing activity. It decides how much time to devote to z by maximising
its expected welfare as above.
We write the growth of productivity as:
6At+1
At
= a0 + a1zt + ut (7)
where ut is an error process, and the parameter a1 is the e⁄ect of the entrepreneurial activity on produc-
tivity growth.
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What this is telling us is that entrepreneurs make allowance for the productivity growth already coming
from other sources when they decide on optimal e⁄ort; they exactly o⁄set these in their decision, so that
it is purely entrepreneurs that determine productivity growth. To evaluate this equation we note that our
tax rates are a random walk and that (see appendix) ct
yt is non-stationary. We approximate the latter as a











































We now linearise this as
A1
A0
= ￿0 ￿ ￿1(￿0 + ￿0
0) + error0
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￿0lc0 is the tax on entrepreneurs normalised by the ratio of preference-adjusted leisure to
consumption; and since
At+1
At = ￿lnAt+1 + 1; gathering constants as ￿
0
0 and letting u0
t = errort we obtain
￿lnAt+1 = ￿
0
0 ￿ ￿1(￿t + ￿0
t) + u0
t
What we see is that the ￿ tax rate on entrepreneurs￿consists of both the general tax rate and the particular
imposts levied on business activity as such. These would include corporation tax for example if it is not
rebated to the shareholder as an imputed tax already paid on dividends. Here we pay especial attention to
the levies on entry and exit from business as measured by international bodies.
3.1 Completing the model
To complete the model, we require:
(1) the government budget constraint which brings together the revenues it raises from households and
the transfer it pays over; the government too can borrow from abroad via foreign bonds but for simplicity
we assume it does not as it has no impact on the model￿ s workings.
￿sct + ￿tzt = ￿t
(2) goods market clearing in which households buy consumption and investment goods (gross investment
= kt+1 ￿(1￿￿)kt) from ￿rms who may supply them either from their own output or from net imports (m)
purchaseable on the world market at going (exogenous) world prices. If ￿rms have excess output they export
it onto the world market at these prices. We set world prices at unity, ignoring terms of trade changes as an
exogenous variable with no impact on the model￿ s workings.
yt + mt = ct + kt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)kt
It can easily be veri￿ed that the balance of payments constraint is implied (via Walras￿Law) by the
household and government budget constraints, the constraint that ￿rms have no surplus pro￿ts (all earnings
are distributed via wages and dividends) and goods market clearing.3
3Thus taking the household budget constraint
(1 + ￿t)ct + kt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)kt + bt+1 = yt + (1 + rt)bt + ￿t ￿ ￿tzt
we note that the tax terms cancel with the government transfer via the government￿ s budget constraint so that
ct + kt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)kt + bt+1 = yt + (1 + rt)bt
Now we use market clearing to substitute out for yt so that
ct + kt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)kt + bt+1 = ct + kt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)kt ￿ mt + (1 + rt)bt:
Cancelling terms yields the balance of payments
bt+1 ￿ bt = rtbt ￿ mt
where net lending abroad (the capital account de￿cit) equals net interest from abroad minus net imports (the current account
surplus).
83.2 Solution of the model
The model is most conveniently analysed in loglinear form. We have from (3):
lnct = ￿ln(1 + ￿t) + Et lnct+1 + Et ln(1 + ￿t+1) ￿ Et ln(1 + rt+1) + constant (8)
Here we have made use of the fact that when x is lognormally distributed lnEx = E lnx + 0:5varlnx:
We assume throughout that our errors are lognormal and have a constant variance, so that the variance and










)￿t + lnct ￿ lnwt + ln￿t + constant (9)
Using (5a) above to substitute out wages (and assuming lnxt ￿ ln(1￿xt￿zt) because leisure and working
time are approximately equally divided and assuming entrepreneurial time is very small relative to the other
two) yields:
lnxt = l￿￿t + 0:5flnct ￿ lnytg + 0:5ln￿t+ constant (10)






It can be shown that flnct￿lnytg is a non-stationary process (for the formal derivation see the appendix);
the reason lies in the permanent income hypothesis, that consumption equals permanent income from home
output plus interest on foreign assets. The stock of foreign assets then follows a random walk because con-
sumers use foreign assets as a way of smoothing any ￿ uctuations of home income around permanent income.
It follows that we can replace this term (plus the stationary preference error) with a non-stationary error
process, which will plainly be correlated with the other errors in the model and may also be autocorrelated.
In order to solve the model and eliminate expected future terms it is necessary to make assumptions
about the behaviour of the exogenous variables. We assume that world real interest rates, r, are stationary
and autoregressive of order 1: rt = (1￿￿)r￿+￿rt￿1+￿t: We assume that all the policy variables, essentially
the tax rates, are random walks, which is frequently found empirically since tax changes are generally the
result of policy change which is by construction unexpected.
A full explicit solution in terms of the forcing processes requires dynamic programming. However as
noted earlier we treat the log of the consumption/income ratio in (10) as a random walk error process and
9include it with the error due to work preferences, also likely to be a random walk like productivity. Thus
our model for estimation becomes:
(7) ￿lnAt+1 = ￿
0
0 ￿ ￿1(￿t + ￿0
t) + u0










1￿L: We then substitute this for lnAt in equation 6, which becomes our ￿rst
equation to be estimated
(10) ln(1 ￿ xt) = ￿l￿￿t + vt;
where as noted above we have treated ln(1 ￿ x) ￿ ￿lnx








i) +   ln(1 ￿ xt) + (1 ￿  )lnXt + c + ￿
0
0t + ￿t + ￿t (6)





1￿￿ lnrt = ￿t is the e⁄ect of world real interest rates ￿ this is assumed to be picked up by the
time e⁄ects in the panel estimation process (as is ￿
0
0t) while (1￿ )lnXt is assumed to be picked up by the
country and time e⁄ects).
Thus (10) and (6) are our two equations of the model to be taken to the data.
These equations have been chosen for tractability in the context of our panel set-up and data set. Forward-
looking terms for example must be substituted out because we are in practice unable to solve each country
model separately over the sample period. Other variables, such as wages, we have no data for. We could have
had an additional equation for consumption and may do so in a more elaborate version later: but it too must
be a solution equation and so little appears to be gained at the cost of an extra error term to be bootstrapped.
One of our two equations (6) contains the production function which is essentially structural, an ￿ engineering
relationship￿with capital solved out in terms of its ￿rst-order condition. The labour supply and productivity
equations (the latter substituted into the production function) are solution equations derived from ￿rst order
conditions and a solution for their components using approximation techniques that exploit the unit root
properties of the exogenous productivity, preference and tax processes and of the consumption-GDP ratio.
The resulting two error terms include what the data and model imply are the omitted e⁄ects of the exogenous
errors. These e⁄ects do not include the direct e⁄ects of interest in the model, of tax rates on productivity
growth and on labour supply; these are explicitly included in the model.
Thus the two equations constitute a ￿ structural model￿in the sense that they jointly exactly replicate the
data country by country in a way entirely constrained by the model and its solution method.
We present in what follows two versions of the model for testing on the panel data set:
(1) The model as estimated at the structural equation level in conformity with the theory.
10(2) The model with the tax coe¢ cients set to zero: a ￿ no-tax-e⁄ect model￿ , with the other coe¢ cients
re-estimated with this constraint.
Empirical work
The procedure we follow to test the model we have set out is that of bootstrapping. The idea is that we
treat the model ￿ in the form of the two equations set out above ￿ as the true or ￿ null￿hypothesis. We
estimate this model on the available post-war annual data, for 76 countries from 1970-2000. The resulting
2 structural errors for each country-period are thus the implied ￿ true errors￿under the model. These errors
and the tax rates have time-series properties which we assume di⁄er country by country; we estimate a
time-series process for each country error and tax process, which in turn implies a set of 4 random errors
(structural and tax) for each country over the period 1970-2000. Our bootstrapping procedure is then to
draw the whole vector of random errors as a 76-country bloc repeatedly with replacement for a 30-year
sample period (we draw them as a vector to retain any patterns of simultaneous correlation); input them
into the country time-series processes to generate a resulting set of 30-year errors; input these in turn into the
model to generate a 30-year sample of data for the endogenous variables. Such a 30-year sample of data is
one pseudo-sample. We generate 1000 of these pseudo-samples. The idea is that these 1000 pseudo-samples
represent the sampling variation that would occur according to the model.
We then investigate whether data descriptions that would emerge from the model are rejected by the
data. We do this by estimating the descriptive form on the actual data and also on the pseudo-samples; if
the estimate generated on the actual data lie within the 95% con￿dence limits given by the pseudo-samples,
then we say that the model is not rejected by the data and vice versa.
The results for the model equations are as follows (with ￿xed country and time e⁄ects on each equation).
We estimate equation (6) as:
(1)





Number of obs = 2280
F(105, 2174) = 864:00
R2 = 0:9756
￿ R2 = 0:9745
Root MSE = 0:1649
We estimate the structural labour supply equation, (10) as:
11(3)
ln(1 ￿ xt) = c2 + 0:0128ln(1 ￿ ￿t)
(0:01)
Number of obs = 2280
F(103, 2024) = 278:53
R2 = 0:9308
￿ R2 = 0:9275
Root MSE = 0:0442
The error term from this equation is a combination of labour supply preferences and the log of the
consumption/income ratio.
Bootstrapping this model as described above generates 1000 pseudo-samples. With it we then investigate
a data description for growth. In it growth depends on the (general plus entrepreneurial) tax rate and
the rate of change of the general tax rate (the latter because growth in output not caused by productivity
depends of the growth in labour supply which in turn depends on the rate of change of the general tax rate).
Note that we have taken ln(1 ￿ taxrate) ￿ ￿taxrate:
Growth rate and taxation ￿ descriptions of data with model-generated 95% con￿dence
bands
We now turn to our test of this above model against the data. We proceed as follows. First we regress the
data for growth on a set of potential regressors with a view to capturing the best (￿ reduced form￿ ) description
of the data. We consider four sets of regressors: the level of business tax, (￿t + ￿0
t); the rate of change of
personal tax, ￿￿t; country dummies; and time dummies.
Table 1: Regression of Growth on Business Tax and the Rate of Change of Personal Tax With Fixed Time
and Country E⁄ects
With ￿xed country and time e⁄ects
￿lnyt = ￿1(￿t + ￿0
t) + ￿2￿￿t Number of obs = 1748
Actual ￿ Reduced form￿ F(100,1648) = 3:87
standard errors R2 = 0:1903
￿1 ￿0:043 0:027 ￿ R2 = 0:1411
￿2 ￿0:039 0:043 Root MSE = 0:0506
In these equations ￿￿t was insigni￿cant though of the right sign. This term picks up the temporary e⁄ect
on growth of the change in the personal tax rate (which a⁄ects labour supply); this e⁄ect however is very
poorly determined, which is perhaps not surprising as it works through labour supply and we know from
other work that labour supply e⁄ects depend on expected tax and other variables. Here we are unable to
pick up expectations e⁄ects (which could introduce a lead or a lag in the tax variable). We therefore decided
12to look also at an equation with solely the business tax e⁄ect whose level should directly determine growth
on a permanent basis; we would expect this e⁄ect to come through powerfully in the data description and
indeed it seems to do so.
The resulting equation is:
Table 2: Regression of Growth on Business Tax With Fixed Time and Country E⁄ects
With ￿xed country and time e⁄ects Number of obs = 1748
￿lnyt = ￿1(￿t + ￿0
t) F(99,1649) = 3:90
Actual ￿ Reduced form￿ R2 = 0:1899
standard errors ￿ R2 = 0:1412
￿1 ￿0:050 0:027 Root MSE = 0:0506
Using panel data with ￿xed e⁄ects may not be the most e¢ cient model to run. Estimating the model with
random e⁄ects will give a more e¢ cient estimator (the reason for this is that the estimator saves degrees
of freedom by not using the ￿xed country dummies but instead using the regression with ￿xed country
dummies with a weight, to coeerct the regression with time dummies only). The results for the random
e⁄ects estimator are shown in Table 3.
Table 3: Regression of Growth on Business Tax with Random E⁄ects
With random e⁄ects Number of obs = 1748
￿lnyt = ￿1(￿t + ￿0
t) Wald ￿2(1) = 9:91
Actual ￿ Reduced form￿ R2 within = 0:0035
standard errors R2 between = 0:0615
￿1 ￿0:043 0:014 R2 overall = 0:0088
To test whether we should use the ￿xed or random e⁄ects model we run a Hausman test, the results from
this test are shown in Table 4.
Table 4: Hausman Test
￿lnyt = ￿1(￿t + ￿0
t)
Fixed Random Di⁄erence Standard error ￿2(1) P-value
￿1 ￿0:050 ￿0:043 ￿0:007 0:022 0:10 0:751
From Table 4 we ￿nd that we can use either ￿xed or random e⁄ects in the actual data sample without
serious risk of inconsistency. This is of interest in that it tells us that the e⁄ect of business tax in the
13descriptive regression is well-determined and highly signi￿cant.
We now turn to the bootsrapping exercise where we wish to establish the sampling distributions of the
descriptive regression coe¢ cients according to our model. For this exercise it is essential that the estimator
used is consistent in all the potential data samples; otherwise the distribution of ￿ potentially estimated￿
coe¢ cients will be wrongly measured. Hence in what follows we use the ￿xed e⁄ects estimator throughout
the bootstrapping process, since it is known de￿nitely to be consistent in all samples; thus each sample
estimate will give us a ￿ central￿value for the coe¢ cients.
We now report how our chosen descriptive equation ￿ with the business tax rate only ￿ compares with
our basic model. We take the descriptive regression and run it on our bootstrap data for each model. As
noted earlier, this allows us to ￿nd the 95% con￿dence interval implied by the model. In addition it gives the
overall ￿ M-metric￿ , that is the percentile in the bootstrap distribution of all parameters4 jointly where the
actual data regression lies; the higher the percentile, the further into the tail the actual regression lies. As it
happens, in this case with only one parameter of interest the M-metric is directly related to the distribution
of this one parameter.
Table 5: Bootstrap Results for Model with Estimated Tax E⁄ects
￿lnyt = ￿1(￿t + ￿0
t)￿With ￿xed country and time e⁄ects
95% interval for basic model Actual Lower Upper M-metric
a1 ￿0:050 ￿0:054 0:017 90:8%
What we see is that the model is accepted at the 95% level. This is itself of some interest. However,
we do not know whether the data will also accept other models that contradict our model. To assess this
we create an alternative model of this sort: in this we set the tax coe¢ cients to zero, both on business tax
and on personal tax. Thus the alternative model asserts that taxes have no e⁄ect; the only identi￿ed e⁄ects
are of labour in the production function, the rest is the e⁄ect of country and time dummies. The model is
reestimated in this way and new error terms extracted and bootstrapped in just the same way as for the
principal model. We obtain new bootstrap distributions for the data descriptive equation as follows:
4In assessing whether the model is rejected or not we need to use the joint distribution of all the parameters in the description.
The 95% con￿dence intervals shown by each parameter apply to that parameter taken on its own, that is holding the other
parameters as given by their estimated values. For the model as a whole the question is whether the joint values of the estimated
parameters lie within the ￿ 95% contour￿of the joint distribution. The idea here is that the model generates a joint distribution
of the descriptive (￿ reduced form￿ ) parameters; ranging from the most likely joint values (the mean of the bootstrap distribution)
out to the least likely. The joint value likelihood can be computed by assuming a multi-variate normal distribution; however this
is only used up to the ordering of the joint variates, the likelihood itself is discarded to give a metric (the Mahalanobis metric).
Instead the probability of each metric then being given by the likelihood, it is determined from the bootstraps; speci￿cally the
95% value of the metric is given by the value of the metric when 95th percentile bootstrap. The model as a whole is then rejected
if the actual metric estimated on the data exceeds this 95th percentile. One can think of this 95th percentile as a contour line
on a joint distribution. Clearly such a rejection is related somehow to the rejection on the parameters individually; however,
this relationship depends on the covariance matrix of these parameters which is a crucial ingredient of the joint distribution.
Thus there is no simple link from the individual rejections to the overall rejection of the model.
14Alternative (no-tax-e⁄ect) model:
Table 6: Bootstrap Results for Model with Zero Tax E⁄ect
￿lnyt = ￿1(￿t + ￿0
t)￿With ￿xed country and time e⁄ects
95% interval for 0-tax-e⁄ect model Actual Lower Upper M-metric
a1 ￿0:050 ￿0:040 0:030 98:1%
We see that this alternative model is rejected, with an M-metric of 98.1%. Thus our model is accepted
by the data at the 95% level, whereas the alternative model with no tax e⁄ect is rejected.
So far we have tested the basic model from the zero side, so to speak ￿ to see whether it dominates a
no-tax-e⁄ect model. It is also of interest to test it from the other side: to see whether a business tax e⁄ect
higher than freely estimated would satisfy the data description. So we also reestimated the model imposing
an increased coe¢ cient on business tax and retrieving the implied new errors. We used two cases, one in
which we set the coe¢ cient to ￿0:02 and another in which we set the coe¢ cient to ￿0:04. The results for
the ￿0:02 case are shown in Table 7 and the ￿0:04 case in Table 8.
Table 7: Bootstrap Results for Model with Tax E⁄ects and Coe¢ cient on Business Tax set to -0.02
Coe¢ cient on Business Tax Set to ￿0:02
￿lnyt = ￿1(￿t + ￿0
t)￿With ￿xed country and time e⁄ects
Actual Lower Upper M-metric
a1 ￿0:050 ￿0:060 0:012 82:1%
Table 8: Bootstrap Results for Model with Tax E⁄ects and Coe¢ cient on Business Tax set to -0.04
Coe¢ cient on Business Tax Set to ￿0:04
￿lnyt = ￿1(￿t + ￿0
t)￿With ￿xed country and time e⁄ects
Actual Lower Upper M-metric
a1 ￿0:050 ￿0:062 0:011 81:7%
What is interesting about this is that there is an improvement in the model￿ s performance vis-a-vis the
data description as the model￿ s business tax e⁄ect is raised. Thus if it is raised in absolute size by two
standard errors to -0.02 (from the estimated -0.014) the M-metric falls from 90.8% to 82.1%. However the
improvement stops from here on. If it is raised further to -0.04 it improves barely at all; this must be
because it induces errors in the model whose variation is correlated with the tax and o⁄set its e⁄ect on the
distribution of a1. Hence the data estimation of the model itself combined with the data description tell us
15that a business tax parameter of between -0.014 and -0.02 is the most compatible with the data.5
3.3 A discussion of the empirical results
We may start by discussing the ￿ conventional￿way of testing the model using the standard reduced form
approach. Thus we note that the model implication ￿ viz that the level of business tax and the rate of
change of general tax both a⁄ect growth ￿ meets a mixed reception. The business tax e⁄ect alone is fairly
signi￿cant against the usual zero alternative; the general tax e⁄ect is not. We concluded from this that the
data description should not include the general tax e⁄ect as it does not contribute to explaining growth.
We might also have concluded that there was evidence of a business tax e⁄ect. However as we have argued
above this is not a persuasive test for two reasons. First, the error terms in the reduced form will include
omitted nonlinear e⁄ects of tax on growth that can bias the ￿ reduced form￿coe¢ cient. Second, other models
in which tax plays no part could also generate this ￿ reduced form￿result.
So we reviewed next the evidence from the bootstrapping method, where instead of the con￿dence
intervals generated by the ￿ reduced form￿we look at those produced by bootstrapping the structural model.
We found here that the model was accepted by the data description and furthermore that an alternative
model with no tax e⁄ects was rejected by it and thus also dominated in likelihood by our model. In fact a
model with a higher business tax coe¢ cient of -0.02 is more likely viewed from its ￿t with the data description
equation (though less likely viewed as a dierct estimate from the production function).
What is also striking is the insight a⁄orded by the bootstrapping procedure into the biases in the ￿ reduced
5If we use the general data description with both variables entered, the distribution is not so tightly de￿ned. We obtain:
￿lnyt = ￿1(￿t + ￿0
t) + ￿2￿￿t￿With ￿xed country and time e⁄ects
95% interval for basic model Actual Lower Upper M-metric
a1 ￿0:043 ￿0:044 0:027
a2 ￿0:039 ￿0:192 0:027 62:5%
and
￿lnyt = ￿1(￿t + ￿0
t) + ￿2￿￿t￿With ￿xed country and time e⁄ects
95% interval for 0-tax-e⁄ect model Actual Lower Upper M-metric
a1 ￿0:043 ￿0:029 0:041
a2 ￿0:039 ￿0:197 0:023 73:5%
Here we see that neither model is rejected. But if we compare the no-tax-e⁄ect model with the basic model we see that its
M-metric at 73.5% lies well above the 62.5% of the basic model. We can interpret this as a measure of relative likelihood of each
model, conditional on the data. That is, the data regression is closer to the most likely parameter combination according to
our model than according to the alternative model. If we could assume a particular likelihood distribution ￿ e.g. multi-variate
normal ￿ then we could translate the M-metrics into exact likelihoods.
We also ￿nd that the model with the higher business tax e⁄ect (of -0.02) performs better than the one with the estimated
tax e⁄ect, just as in the case focused on in the text. Hence if we were to use this data description, we would get essentially
the same results if we were to set the con￿dence level higher, at say 65%. We would reject the no-tax-e⁄ect model and accept
the two tax-e⁄ect ones, with the likely tax e⁄ect lying somewhere between the two. If we maintain the 95% con￿dence level it
still remains the case that this is the likely tax e⁄ect range.
￿lnyt = ￿1(￿t + ￿0
t) + ￿2￿￿t￿With ￿xed country and time e⁄ects
95% interval for ￿0:02 coe¢ cient on tax Actual Lower Upper M-metric
a1 ￿0:043 ￿0:051 0:021
a2 ￿0:039 ￿0:183 0:031 53:5%
16form￿coe¢ cients under the null hypothesis. Thus we know from simulating the model for a shock to the
business tax rate that growth (in steady state) increases by 0.14%-0.2% for every 0.1 (ie 10 percentage point)
fall in the business tax rate under the model. However the ￿ reduced form￿coe¢ cients give a value for this
business tax e⁄ect that is up to three and a half times as big. This indicates a huge amount of bias in the
￿ reduced form￿coe¢ cients; these values bear little relation to what the model would produce as the simulated
e⁄ect. The model when bootstrapped reveals that the correlation of the tax shocks with the errors creates
massive bias in the ￿ reduced form￿estimates. To put it in concrete terms, for example when the business
tax rate is cut this causes a rise in consumption and labour supply as well as in productivity growth; the
former two create an independent source of output increase over and above the steady state increase; this
association raises the estimated e⁄ect of a business tax cut on growth.
A last point of interest is that we were unable to change the structural coe¢ cients on tax upwards beyond
a certain point, even though the ￿ reduced form￿results would have been better ￿tted by a large business tax
coe¢ cient, cetris paribus. What we found was that the data forced the structural model errors to o⁄set the
e⁄ect of raising the business tax coe¢ cient beyond a certain point. Had we kept the freedom to ￿ make up￿
the structural errors we would have been able to ￿t the ￿ reduced form￿results easily. But because we forced
the structural model to ￿t the data through the implied errors used in the bootstrapping, the ￿tting of the
￿ reduced form￿was constrained. It is as if our results can only emerge satisfactorily if they can go through
two mincers, each of a di⁄erent shape; a structural mincer and a ￿ reduced form￿mincer; only if the model
can force its way through both are its results to be believed.
4 Conclusions
The overall conclusion of this empirical work on estimating and simulating general equilibrium models of
growing small open economies is that they are consistent with the panel post-war data. Growth does indeed
depend on tax rates, particularly the business tax rate (interpreted as the tax, including regulative, burden
on an individual businessman). But ￿ reduced form￿estimates of this e⁄ect are unreliable and biased upwards.
Instead one must construct the structural model, check whether its estimates cohere with the data both at
the structural level and then at the ￿ reduced form￿level; this paper is an illustration of how this bootstrap-
based technique exploits the data at both these levels. Then the parameters in this structural construct,
thus tested, can be used to estimate the e⁄ect of a shock to the tax rates.
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205 Appendix: the non-stationarity of {lnct ￿ lnytg
Start with the household budget constraint after substituting out tax and transfer terms via the government
budget constraint and wage and dividends from the ￿rm￿ s ￿rst order conditions; this is line 3 of footnote 2:
ct + kt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)kt + bt+1 = yt + (1 + rt)bt (A1)
In expectational form the household￿ s consumption plan must satisfy this constraint as follows after an
in￿nite forward recursion in the value of future bonds:

















t = yt ￿ [kt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)kt]
























(1 + rt+1)(1 + rt+2)
(A3)
It follows that
























The term inside the braces is the household￿ s spendable wealth hence the whole RHS expression is
permanent net income or
ct = :(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + rt)bt + y0
t (A5)
In steady state (at T) we have (where g is the growth rate)
cT = (1 ￿ ￿)
(






















= (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + r￿)bT + y0
T (A6)
in which all of cT;bT;yT will be growing at g.
21Now consider the movement of ct
yt which from A5) is:
ct
yt















































We know that in steady state bt
yt will tend to some steady level because of household behaviour. However
until this has occurred it is driven by a di⁄erence equation of the form:
xt+1 = (1 + qt)xt + ￿t (A10)
where qt = rt ￿ gt will vary from positive to negative and ￿t = ￿mt
yt will move randomly between steady
states. Plainly xt = bt
yt.will for at least some of the periods between steady states will be a randomly
disturbed explosive (or unit root) di⁄erence equation and will therefore be non-stationary (in other words
it will end up at a new steady state randomly di⁄erent from its initial value). So therefore will lnct ￿ lnyt
which contains its log.
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